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This article offers a formal account of curiosity and insight in terms of
active (Bayesian) inference. It deals with the dual problem of inferring
states of the world and learning its statistical structure. In contrast to cur-
rent trends in machine learning (e.g., deep learning), we focus on how
people attain insight and understanding using just a handful of observa-
tions, which are solicited through curious behavior. We use simulations
of abstract rule learning and approximate Bayesian inference to show
that minimizing (expected) variational free energy leads to active sam-
pling of novel contingencies. This epistemic behavior closes explanatory
gaps in generativemodels of theworld, thereby reducing uncertainty and
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satisfying curiosity. We then move from epistemic learning to model se-
lection or structure learning to show how abductive processes emerge
when agents test plausible hypotheses about symmetries (i.e., invari-
ances or rules) in their generative models. The ensuing Bayesian model
reduction evinces mechanisms associated with sleep and has all the hall-
marks of “aha” moments. This formulation moves toward a computa-
tional account of consciousness in the pre-Cartesian sense of sharable
knowledge (i.e., con: “together”; scire: “to know”).
1 Introduction
This article presents a formal (computational) description of epistemic be-
havior that calls on two themes in theoretical neurobiology. The first is
the use of Bayesian principles for understanding the nature of intelligent
and purposeful behavior (Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; Oaksford &
Chater, 2003; Coltheart, Menzies, & Sutton, 2010; Nelson, McKenzie, Cot-
trell, & Sejnowski, 2010; Collins&Koechlin, 2012; Solway&Botvinick, 2012;
Donoso, Collins, & Koechlin, 2014; Seth, 2014; Koechlin, 2015; Lu, Rojas,
Beckers, & Yuille, 2016). The second is the role of self-modeling, reflection,
and sleep (Metzinger, 2003; Hobson, 2009). In particular, we formulate cu-
riosity and insight in terms of inference—namely, the updating of beliefs
about how our sensations are caused. Our focus is on the transitions from
states of ignorance to states of insight—namely, states with (i.e., con) aware-
ness (i.e., scire) of causal contingencies. We associate these epistemic tran-
sitions with the process of Bayesian model selection and the emergence of
insight. In short, we try to show that resolving uncertainty about the world,
through active inference, necessarily entails curious behavior and conse-
quent ‘aha’ or eureka moments.
The basic theme of this article is that one can cast learning, inference,
and decision making as processes that resolve uncertainty about the world.
This theme is central to many issues in psychology, cognitive neuroscience,
neuroeconomics, and theoretical neurobiology, which we consider in terms
of curiosity and insight. The purpose of this article is not to review the
large literature in these fields or provide a synthesis of established ideas
(e.g., Schmidhuber, 1991; Oaksford & Chater, 2001; Koechlin et al., 2003;
Botvinick & An, 2008; Nelson et al., 2010; Navarro & Perfors, 2011; Tenen-
baum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011; Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012;
Collins & Koechlin, 2012; Solway & Botvinick, 2012; Donoso et al., 2014).
Our purpose is to show that the issues this diverse literature addresses
can be accommodated by a single imperative (minimization of expected
free energy, or resolution of uncertainty) that already explains many other
phenomena–for example, decision making under uncertainty, stochas-
tic optimal control, evidence accumulation, addiction, dopaminergic re-
sponses, habit learning, reversal learning, devaluation, saccadic searches,
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scene construction, place cell activity, omission-related responses, mis-
match negativity, P300 responses, phase-precession, and theta-gamma cou-
pling (Friston, FitzGerald et al., 2016; Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwarten-
beck, & Pezzulo, 2017). In what follows, we ask how the resolution of un-
certainty might explain curiosity and insight.
1.1 Curiosity. Curiosity is an important concept in many fields, includ-
ing psychology (Berlyne, 1950, 1954; Loewenstein, 1994), computational
neuroscience, and robotics (Schmidhuber, 1991; Oaksford & Chater, 2001).
Much of neural development can be understood as learning contingen-
cies about the world and how we can act on the world (Saegusa, Metta,
Sandini, Sakka, 2009; Nelson et al., 2010; Nelson, Divjak, Gudmundsdottir,
Martignon, & Meder, 2014). This learning rests on intrinsically motivated
curious behavior that enables us to predict the consequences of our ac-
tions: as nicely summarized by Still and Precup (2012), “A learner should
choose a policy that also maximizes the learner’s predictive power. This
makes the world both interesting and exploitable.” This epistemic, world-
disclosing perspective speaks to the notion of optimal data selection and
important questions about how rational or optimal we are in querying our
world (Oaksford, Chater, Larkin, 2000; Oaksford & Chater, 2003). Clearly,
the epistemic imperatives behind curiosity are especially prescient in de-
velopmental psychology and beyond: ”In the absence of external reward,
babies and scientists and others explore their world. Using some sort of
adaptive predictiveworldmodel, they improve their ability to answer ques-
tions such aswhat happens if I do this or that?” (Schmidhuber, 2006). In neu-
rorobotics, these imperatives are often addressed in terms of active learning
(Markant & Gureckis, 2014; Markant, Settles, & Gureckis, 2016), with a fo-
cus on intrinsic motivation (Baranes & Oudeyer, 2009). Active learning and
intrinsic motivation are also key concepts in educational psychology, where
they play an important role in enabling insight and understanding (Eccles
& Wigfield, 2002).
1.2 Insight and Eureka Moments. The Eureka effect (Auble, Franks,
& Soraci, 1979) was introduced to psychology by comparing the recall for
sentences that were initially confusing but subsequently understood. The
implicit resolution of confusion appears to be the main determinant of re-
call and the emotional concomitants of insight (Shen, Yuan, Liu, & Luo,
2016). Several psychological theories for solving insight problems have
been proposed—for example, progress monitoring and representational
change theory (Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001; MacGregor, Ormerod,
& Chronicle, 2001). Both enjoy empirical support, largely from eye move-
ment studies (Jones, 2003). Furthermore, several psychophysical and neu-
roimaging studies have attempted to clarify the functional anatomy of
insight (see Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005), for a psycho-
logical review andDresler et al., 2015, for a review of the neural correlates of
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insight in dreaming and psychosis). In what follows, we offer a normative
framework that complements psychological theories by describing how cu-
riosity engenders insight. Our treatment is framed by two questions posed
by Berlyne (1954) in his seminal treatment of curiosity: ”The first question
is why human beings devote so much time and effort to the acquisition
of knowledge. . . . The second question is why, out of the infinite range of
knowable items in the universe, certain pieces of knowledge are more ar-
dently sought and more readily retained than others?” (p. 180).
In brief, we will try to show that the acquisition of knowledge and its
retention are emergent properties of active inference—specifically, that cu-
riositymanifests as an active sampling of theworld tominimize uncertainty
about hypotheses—or explanations—for states of the world, while reten-
tion of knowledge entails the Bayesian model selection of the most plausi-
ble explanation. The first process rests on curious, evidence-accumulating,
uncertainty-resolving behavior, while the second operates on knowledge
structures (i.e., generative models) after evidence has been accumulated.
Our approach rests on the free energy principle, which asserts that any
sentient creature must minimize the entropy of its sensory exchanges with
the world. Mathematically, entropy is uncertainty or expected surprise,
where surprise can be expressed as a free energy function of sensations and
(Bayesian) beliefs about their causes. This suggests that creatures are com-
pelled tominimize uncertainty or expected free energy. In what follows, we
will see that resolving different sorts of uncertainty furnishes principled ex-
planations for different sorts of behavior. These levels of uncertainty pertain
to plausible states of the world, plausible policies that change those states,
and plausible models of those changes.
The first level of uncertainty is about the causes of sensory outcomes
under a particular policy (i.e., sequence of actions). Reducing this sort of
uncertainty corresponds to perceptual inference (a.k.a. state estimation). In
other words, the first thing we need to do is infer the current state of the
world and the context in which we are operating. We then have to con-
tend with uncertainty about policies per se that can be cast in terms of
uncertainty about future states of the world, outcomes, and the probabilis-
tic contingencies that bind them. We will see that minimizing these three
forms of expected surprise—by choosing an uncertainty resolving policy—
corresponds to information-seeking epistemic behavior, goal-seeking prag-
matic behavior, and novelty-seeking curious behavior, respectively. In
short, by pursuing the best policy, we accumulate experience and reduce
uncertainty about probabilistic contingencies through epistemic learning—
namely, inferring (the parameters of our models of) how outcomes are
generated.
Finally, curious, novelty-seeking policies enable us to reduce our uncer-
tainty about our generative models per se, leading to structure learning,
insight, and understanding. Here, a generative model constitutes a hypoth-
esis about how observable outcomes are generated, where we entertain
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Table 1: Sources of Uncertainty Scored by (Expected) Free Energy and the
Behaviors Entailed by Its Minimization (Resolution of Uncertainty through
Approximate Bayesian Inference).
Source of Free Energy
Uncertainty (Surprise) Minimization Active Inference
Uncertainty about
hidden states given a
policy
F(π ) = F(o˜, sπτ , a|π ) With respect
to expected
states sπτ
Perceptual inference
(state estimation)
G(π ) = G(sπτ , a|π ) =
oπτ · oπτ + H · sπτ +
oπτ · Cτ+
oπτ · W · sπτ
Uncertainty about
policies in terms of
expected:
Future states
(intrinsic value)
Future outcomes
(extrinsic value)
Model parameters
(novelty)
With respect
to policies π
Epistemic planning
Intrinsic motivation
Extrinsic motivation
Curiosity
Uncertainty about
model parameters
given a model
F(o˜, sπτ ,π, a|m) With respect
to parameters
a
Epistemic learning
(active learning)
Uncertainty about
the model
F(o˜, sπτ ,π, a|m) With respect
to model m
Structure learning
(insight and
understanding)
competing hypotheses that are, a priori, equally plausible. In short, the last
level of uncertainty reduction entails the selection of models that render
outcomes the least surprising, having suppressed all other forms of un-
certainty. All but the last process require experience to resolve uncertainty
about either the states (inference) or parameters (learning) of a particular
model. However, optimization of the model per se can proceed in a fact-
free, or outcome-free, fashion, using experience accumulated to date. In
other words, no further facts or outcomes are necessary for this last level
of optimization: facts and outcomes are constitutive of the experience on
which this optimization relies. It is this Bayesian model selection we asso-
ciate with fact-free learning (Aragones, Gilboa, Postlewaite, & Schmeidler,
2005) and the emergence of insight (Bowden et al., 2005).
Table 1 provides a summary of these uncertainty-reducing processes,
where uncertainty is associated with free energy formulations of surprise
such that uncertainty-resolving behavior reduces expected free energy. To
motivate and illustrate this formalism, we set ourselves the task of sim-
ulating a curious agent that spontaneously learned rules—governing the
sensory consequences of her action—from limited and ambiguous sensory
evidence (Lu et al., 2016; Tervo, Tenenbaum, & Gershman, 2016). We chose
abstract rule learning to illustrate how conceptual knowledge could be
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accumulated through experience (Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012; Zhang &
Maloney, 2012; Koechlin, 2015) and how implicit Bayesian belief updat-
ing can be accelerated by applying Bayesian principles not to sensory
samples but to beliefs based on those samples. This structure learning
(Tenenbaum et al., 2011; Tervo et al., 2016) is based on recent developments
in Bayesian model selection, namely, Bayesian model reduction (Friston,
Litvak et al., 2016). Bayesian model reduction refers to the evaluation of re-
duced forms of a full model to find simpler (reduced) models using only
posterior beliefs (Friston & Penny, 2011). Reduced models furnish parsi-
monious explanations for sensory contingencies that are inherently more
generalizable (Navarro & Perfors, 2011; Lu et al., 2016) and, as we will see,
provide for simpler and more efficient inference. In brief, we use simula-
tions of abstract rule learning to show that context-sensitive contingencies,
which are manifest in a high-dimensional space of latent or hidden states,
can be learned using straightforward variational principles (i.e., minimiza-
tion of free energy). This speaks to the notion that people ”use their knowl-
edge of real-world environmental statistics to guide their search behavior”
(Nelson et al., 2014). We then show that Bayesian model reduction adds an
extra level of inference, which rests on testing plausible hypotheses about
the structure of internal or generative models. We will see that this process
is remarkably similar to physiological processes in sleep, where redundant
(synaptic) model parameters are eliminated to minimize model complexity
(Hobson & Friston, 2012). We then show that qualitative changes in model
structure emerge when Bayesian model reduction operates online during
the assimilation of experience. The ensuing optimization ofmodel evidence
provides a plausible (Bayesian) account of abductive reasoning that looks
very much like an “aha” moment. To simulate something akin to an aha
moment requires a formalism that deals explicitly with probabilistic beliefs
about states of the world and its causal structure. This contrasts with the
sort of structure or manifold learning that predominates in machine learn-
ing (e.g., deep learning; LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015), where the objec-
tive is to discover structure in large data sets by learning the parameters of
neural networks. This article asks whether abstract rules can be identified
using active (Bayesian) inference, following a handful of observations and
plausible, uncertainty-reducing hypotheses about how sensory outcomes
are generated.
1.3 Active Inference and the Resolution of Uncertainty. Active infer-
ence is a corollary of the free energy principle that tries to explain action
and perception in terms of minimizing variational free energy. Variational
free energy is a proxy for surprise or (negative) Bayesian model evidence.
This means that minimizing free energy corresponds to avoiding surprises
or maximizing model evidence, and minimizing expected free energy cor-
responds to resolving uncertainty. The active aspect of active inference em-
phasizes that we are the embodied authors of our sensations. This means
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that the consequences of action must themselves be inferred (Baker, Saxe,
& Tenenbaum, 2009). In turn, this implies that we have (prior) beliefs about
our behavior. Active inference assumes that the only (self-consistent) prior
belief is that we will minimize free energy; in other words, we (believe we)
will resolve uncertainty through active sampling of theworld (Friston,Mat-
tout, & Kilner, 2011; Friston et al., 2015). Alternative prior beliefs can be
discounted by reductio ad absurdum: if we do not believe that wewill resolve
uncertainty through active inference, and active inference realizes beliefs by
minimizing uncertainty (i.e., fulfilling expectations), then active inference
will not minimize uncertainty.
From a technical perspective, this article introduces generalizations of
active inference for discrete state-space models (i.e., hidden Markov mod-
els and Markov decision processes) along two lines, both concerning the
parameters of generative models that encode probabilistic contingencies.
First, posterior beliefs about both hidden states and parameters are in-
cluded in expected free energy, leading to epistemic or exploratory behavior
that tries to resolve ignorance, in addition to risk and ambiguity. In other
words, policies acquire epistemic value in virtue of resolving uncertainty
about states and outcomes (risk and ambiguity) or resolving uncertainty
about contingencies (ignorance)—in otherwords, ”what happens if I do this
or that?” (Schmidhuber, 2006). Second, we consider minimizing the free en-
ergy of themodel per se (as opposed tomodel parameters), in terms of prior
beliefs aboutwhich parameters are necessary to explain observed outcomes
and which parameters are redundant and can be eliminated. As with our
previous treatments of active inference, we pay special attention to biolog-
ical plausibility and try to link optimization to neuronal processes. These
developments can be regarded as rolling back the implications of minimiz-
ing variational free energy under a generic internal or generative model of
the world.
1.4 Overview. This article has three sections. The first briefly reviews
active inference and relates the underlying objective function (expected free
energy) to established notions like utility,mutual information, andBayesian
surprise. The second describes the paradigm used in this article. In brief,
we require agents to learn an abstract rule, in which the correct response is
determined by the color of a cue whose location is determined by another
cue. By transcribing task instructions into the prior beliefs of a simulated
subject, we examine how quickly the rule can be learned—and how this
epistemic learning depends on curious, uncertainty-reducing behavior that
resolves ignorance (about the meaning of cues), ambiguity (about the con-
text or rule in play), and risk (of making a mistake). In the third section,
we turn to Bayesian model reduction or structure learning and consider
the improvement in free energy—and performance—when competing hy-
potheses about themapping between hidden states and outcomes are tested
against the evidence of experience (Nelson et al., 2010). This evidence is
accumulated by posterior beliefs over parameters and can be examined
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offline to simulate sleep and the emergence of eureka moments. We con-
clude with a brief illustration of communicating prior beliefs to others (i.e.,
sharing of knowledge) and discuss the implications for active inference and
artificial intelligence.
2 Active Inference and Free Energy
Active inference assumes that every characteristic (variable) of an agent
minimizes variational free energy (Friston, 2013). This leads to some sur-
prisingly simple update rules for perception, planning, and learning. In
principle, the active inference scheme described in this section can be
applied to any paradigm or choice behavior. It has been used to model
waiting games (Friston et al., 2013), two-step maze tasks (Friston et al.,
2015), evidence accumulation in the urn task (FitzGerald, Schwartenbeck,
Moutoussis, Dolan, & Friston, 2015), trust games from behavioral eco-
nomics (Moutoussis, Trujillo-Barreto, El-Deredy, Dolan, & Friston, 2014),
addictive behavior (Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Mathys, Dolan, Wurst,
Kronbichler, & Friston, 2015), saccadic eye movements in scene construc-
tion (Mirza, Adams,Mathys, & Friston, 2016), and engineering benchmarks
such as the mountain car problem (Friston, Adams, & Montague, 2012). It
has also been used with computational fMRI (Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald,
Mathys, Dolan, & Friston, 2015). In short, the simulations used to illustrate
the emergence of curiosity and insight below follow from a single principle:
the minimization of free energy (i.e., surprise) or maximization of model
evidence.
Active inference rests on a generative model of observed outcomes.
This model is used to infer the most likely causes of outcomes in terms
of expected states of the world. These states are called latent, or hidden
because they can only be inferred through observations that are usually lim-
ited. Crucially, observations depend on action (e.g., where you are looking),
which requires the generative model to entertain expectations about out-
comes under different sequences of action (i.e., policies). Because themodel
generates the consequences of action, it must have expectations about fu-
ture states. These expectations are optimized byminimizing variational free
energy,which renders them themost likely states of theworld given current
observations. Crucially, the prior probability of a policy depends on the free
energy expected when pursuing that policy. The (expected) free energy is a
proxy for uncertainty and has a number of familiar special cases, including
expected utility, epistemic value, Bayesian surprise, and mutual informa-
tion. After evaluating the expected free energy of each policy; and implic-
itly their posterior probabilities, the most likely action can be selected. This
action generates a new outcome, and the (perception action) cycle starts
again.
The resulting behavior represents a principled sampling of sensory cues
that has both epistemic and pragmatic aspects. Generally, behavior in an
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ambiguous context is dominated by epistemic imperatives until there is no
further uncertainty to resolve and pragmatic (prior) preferences predomi-
nate. At this point, explorative behavior gives way to exploitative behavior.
In this article, we are interested in epistemic behavior, and use prior pref-
erences only to establish a task or instruction set—namely, report a choice
when sufficiently confident.
The formal description of active inference that follows introduces many
terms and expressions that might appear a bit daunting at first reading.
However, most of the technical material represents a standard treatment
of Markov decision processes in terms of belief propagation or variational
message passing that has been described in a series of previous papers. Fur-
thermore, the simulations reported in this article and previous papers use
exactly the same routines (see the software note at the end of the article).We
have therefore tried to focus on the essential ideas (and variables) to provide
an accessible and basic account of active inference, so that we can focus on
curiosity (epistemic novelty-seeking behavior) and insight (Bayesianmodel
reduction). People who want a more detailed account of the basic active in-
ference scheme can refer to Table 2 (for a full glossary of terms described in
the appendix) and Friston, FitzGerald et al. (2016) and Friston et al. (2017).
2.1 The GenerativeModel. Figure 1 provides a schematic specification
of the generative model used for the sorts of problems considered in this
article. This model is described in more detail in the appendix. In brief, out-
comes at any particular time depend on hidden states, while hidden states
evolve in a way that depends on action. The generative model is specified
by two sets of high-dimensionalmatrices or arrays. The first,Am, maps from
hidden states to the mth outcome or modality—for example, exteroceptive
(e.g., visual) or proprioceptive (e.g., eye position) modalities. These param-
eters encode the likelihood of an outcome given their hidden causes. The
second set, Bn, prescribes transitions among the nth factor of hidden states,
under an action specified by the current policy.1 These hidden factors corre-
spond to different attributes of theworld, like the location, color, or category
of an object.2 The remaining parameters encode prior beliefs about future
outcomes Cm and initial states Dn. The probabilistic mappings or contin-
gencies are generally parameterized as Dirichlet distributions, whose suffi-
cient statistics are concentration parameters. Concentration parameters can
be thought of as counting the number of times a particular combination of
1
Parameter matrices in bold denote known parameters. In this article, we consider
that all model parameters are known (or have been learned), with the exception of the
likelihood mapping; namely, the A parameters.
2
Implicit in this notation is the factorization of hidden states into factors, whose tran-
sitions can be modeled with separate probability transition matrices. This means that the
transitions among the levels or states of one factor do not depend on another factor. For
example, the way an object moves does not depend on its color.
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Figure 1: Generative model and (approximate) posterior. A generative model
specifies the joint probability of outcomes or consequences and their (latent or
hidden) causes. Usually the model is expressed in terms of a likelihood (the
probability of consequences given causes) and priors over causes. When a prior
depends on a random variable, it is called an empirical prior. Here, the likeli-
hood is specified by a high-dimensional array A whose components are the
probability of an outcome under every combination of hidden states. The em-
pirical priors in this instance pertain to transitions among hidden states B that
may depend on action, where actions are determined probabilistically in terms
of policies (sequences of actions denoted by π ). The key aspect of this genera-
tive model is that policies are more probable a priori if they minimize the (path
integral of) expected free energy G. Bayesian model inversion refers to the in-
verse mapping from consequences to causes—estimating the hidden states and
other variables that cause outcomes. In variational Bayesian inversion, one has
to specify the form of an approximate posterior distribution, which is provided
in the lower panel. This particular form uses a mean-field approximation in
which posterior beliefs are approximated by the product of marginal distribu-
tions over hidden states or factors. Here, a mean-field approximation is applied
both to posterior beliefs at different points in time and factors. (See the appendix
and Table 2 for a detailed explanation of the variables.) The Bayesian network
(right panel) provides a graphical representation of the dependencies implied
by the equations on the left. Here (and in subsequent figures), t denotes the
current time point, and τ indexes all possible time points.
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Figure 2: Schematic overview of belief updating. The left panel lists the belief
updatesmediating perception (i.e., state estimation), policy selection, and learn-
ing; while the right panel assigns the updates to various brain areas. This attri-
bution is purely schematic and serves to illustrate a crude functional anatomy.
Here, we have assigned observed outcomes to visual representations in the oc-
cipital cortex, with visual (what) modalities entering a ventral stream and pro-
prioceptive (where) modalities originating a dorsal stream. Auditory feedback is
associated with the auditory cortex. Hidden states encoding context have been
associated with the hippocampal formation and association (parietal) cortex.
The evaluation of policies, in terms of their (expected) free energy, has been
placed in the caudate. Expectations about policies, assigned to the putamen, are
used to create Bayesian model averages of future outcomes (e.g., in the frontal
eye fields and supplementary motor area). Finally, expected policies specify the
most likely action (e.g., via the deep layers of the superior colliculus). The ar-
rows denote message passing among the sufficient statistics of each factor or
marginal. The appendix and Table 2 explain the equations and variables.
states and outcomes has been observed. In this article, we focus on learning
the likelihood model and therefore assume that state transitions and initial
states are known (or have been learned).
The generative model in Figure 1 means that outcomes are generated
in the following way. First, a policy is selected using a softmax function
of the expected free energy for each policy. Sequences of hidden states are
generated using the probability transitions specified by the selected pol-
icy. Finally, these hidden states generate outcomes in one or more modali-
ties. Figure 2 (left panel) provides a graphical summary of the dependencies
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implied by the generative model in Figure 1. Perception or inference about
hidden states (i.e., state estimation) corresponds to inverting a generative
model given a sequence of outcomes, while learning corresponds to up-
dating the parameters of the model. Perception therefore corresponds to
optimizing expectations of hidden states and policies with respect to vari-
ational free energy, while learning corresponds to accumulating concentra-
tion parameters. These constitute the sufficient statistics of posterior beliefs,
usually denoted by the probability distribution Q(x), where x = s˜, π,A are
hidden or unknown quantities.
2.2 Variational Free Energy and Inference. In variational Bayesian in-
ference, model inversion entails minimizing variational free energy with
respect to the sufficient statistics of approximate posterior beliefs. These be-
liefs are approximate because they assume the posterior can be factorized
into marginal distributions—here, over hidden states at each point in time,
policies, and parameters. This is known as amean-field assumption (see the
factorization of the approximate posterior in the lower right panel of Figure
1). The ensuingminimization of free energywith respect to posterior beliefs
can be expressed as follows (see Table 2 for a glossary of expressions):
Q(x) = argmin
Q(x)
F
≈ P(x|o˜),
F = EQ[lnQ(x) − lnP(o˜, x)],
= D[Q(x)||P(x|o˜)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
divergence
− lnP(o˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
log evidence
= D[Q(x)||P(x)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
complexity
−EQ[lnP(o˜|x)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
accuracy
, (2.1)
where o˜= (o1, . . . , ot ) denotes observations up to the current time. Because
the (Kullback-Leibler, KL) divergence cannot be less than zero, the penulti-
mate equality means that free energy is minimized when the approximate
posterior is the true posterior. At this point, the free energy becomes the
negative log evidence for the generativemodel (Beal, 2003). Thismeans that
minimizing free energy is equivalent tomaximizingmodel evidence, which
is equivalent to minimizing the complexity of accurate explanations for ob-
served outcomes.
Minimizing free energy ensures expectations encode posterior beliefs,
given observed outcomes. However, beliefs about policies rest on future
outcomes. This means that policies should, a priori, minimize the free en-
ergy expected in the future (Friston et al., 2015). This can be formalized as
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follows (see the appendix):
P(π ) = σ (−G(π )),
G(π ) =
∑
τ
G(π, τ ),
G(π, τ ) = EQ˜[lnQ(A, sτ |π ) − lnP(oτ ,A, sτ |o˜, π )]
= EQ˜[lnQ(A) − lnQ(A|sτ , oτ , π )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(negative) novelty
+ EQ˜[lnQ(oτ |π ) − lnQ(oτ |sτ , π )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(negative) intrinsic or epistemic value
− EQ˜[lnP(oτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
extrinsic or expected value
= EQ˜[lnQ(A) − lnQ(A|sτ , oτ , π )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ignorance
+D[Q(oτ |π )||P(oτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk
+ EQ˜[H[P(oτ |sτ )]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ambiguity
(2.2)
where Q˜ = Q(oτ , sτ |π ) = P(oτ |sτ )Q(sτ |π ) is the posterior predictive distri-
bution over hidden states and their outcomes under a particular policy.
When comparing the penultimate expressions for expected free energy (see
equation 2.2) with the free energy per se (see equation 2.1), one sees that
the expected divergence becomes mutual information or information gain
(see the appendix). Here, we have associated the information gain about the
parameters with novelty and information gain about hidden states with in-
trinsic or epistemic value (i.e., salience). Similarly, expected log evidence
becomes expected or extrinsic value provided we associate the prior pref-
erence (log probability) over future outcomes with value. The last equality
provides a complementary interpretation in which the expected complex-
ity of parameters and hidden states becomes ignorance and risk, while
expected inaccuracy becomes ambiguity. We have chosen to label inverse
novelty as ignorance in the sense that novelty affords the opportunity to re-
solve ignorance (i.e., nescience), namely, uncertainty about the contingen-
cies that underwrite outcomes.
There are several special cases of expected free energy that appeal to
(and contextualize) established constructs. For example, maximizing mu-
tual information is equivalent to maximizing (expected) Bayesian surprise
(Itti & Baldi, 2009), where Bayesian surprise is the divergence between pos-
terior and prior beliefs. This can also be interpreted in terms of the principle
of maximum mutual information or minimum redundancy (Barlow, 1961;
Linsker, 1990; Olshausen & Field, 1996; Laughlin, 2001). Because mutual
information cannot be less than zero, it disappears when the (predictive)
posterior ceases to be informed by new observations. This means epistemic
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behavior will search out observations that resolve uncertainty about the
state of the world (e.g., foraging to resolve uncertainty about the hidden lo-
cation of prey or fixating on an informative part of a face). However, when
there is no posterior uncertainty, and the agent is confident about the state
of the world, there can be no further information gain, and epistemic value
will be the same for all policies, enabling extrinsic value to dominate (if it
did not already). This resolution of uncertainty is closely related to satisfy-
ing artificial curiosity (Schmidhuber, 1991; Still & Precup, 2012) and speaks
to the value of information (Howard, 1966), particularly in the context of
evincing information necessary to realize rewards or payoffs (see Meder &
Nelson, 2012). (See alsoNelson et al., 2010,who compare differentmodels of
information gain in explaining perceptual decisions.) Expected complexity
or risk is exactly the same quantity minimized in risk-sensitive or KL con-
trol (Klyubin, Polani, & Nehaniv, 2005; van den Broek, Wiegerinck, & Kap-
pen, 2010), and underpins related (free energy) formulations of bounded
rationality based on complexity costs (Braun, Ortega, Theodorou, & Schaal,
2011; Ortega&Braun, 2013). In otherwords,minimizing expected complex-
ity renders behavior risk sensitive, while maximizing expected accuracy in-
duces ambiguity-resolving behavior.
The new term introduced by this article is the information gain pertain-
ing to the likelihood mapping between hidden states and outcomes. This
term means that policies will be more likely if they resolve uncertainty—
not about hidden states – but about how hidden states generate outcomes.
Put simply, this means policies that expose the agent to novel combinations
of hidden states and outcomes become attractive because they provide ev-
idence for the way that outcomes are generated. In other words, policies
that afford a high degree of novelty resolve ignorance about the relationship
between causes and consequences. The subsequent resolution of this igno-
rance or uncertainty lendsmeaning to outcomes (consequences) in terms of
hidden states (causes). This epistemic affordance will be important in what
follows.
2.3 Belief Updating. Having defined our objective function, the suf-
ficient statistics encoding posterior beliefs can be updated by minimizing
variational free energy. Figure 2 provides these updates. Although the up-
dates look complicated, they are remarkably plausible in terms of neurobio-
logical schemes, as discussed in Friston et al. (2014) and Friston, FitzGerald
et al., 2016). The update rules for expected policies (policy selection) and
learning are the solutions that minimize free energy, while the updates for
expectations over hidden states (for each policy and time) are formulated as
a gradient descent. This is important because it provides a dynamical pro-
cess theory that can be tested against empirical measures of neuronal dy-
namics. We will see examples of simulated neuronal responses later. Note
that the solution for expected policies is a classical softmax function of ex-
pected free energy, while learning entails accumulation of concentration
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parameters based on the co-occurrence of outcomes and combinations
of expected hidden states. Here, the expected hidden states constitute
Bayesian model averages over policy-specific expectations (See Friston,
FitzGerald et al., 2016) for a more thorough discussion of the neurophys-
iological implementation of these updates.)
In novel environments, the heavy lifting rests on learning the parame-
ters (and form) of the likelihood mapping. The interesting aspect of these
parameters is that they mediate interactions among different hidden states.
In other words, they play the role of connections from hidden states to pre-
dicted outcomes. From a neurobiological perspective, this means that the
connections generating predicted outcomes from expected states (or up-
dating hidden states based on outcomes) are necessarily activity dependent
and context sensitive. For example, the first term in the expression for state
estimation or perception in Figure 2 is a linear mixture of outcomes formed
by a connectivity matrix that itself depends on expectations of over hid-
den states. In other words, hidden states interact or conspire to generate
predictions—or select mixtures of outcomes for Bayesian belief updating.
We will return to the importance of these interactions when we consider
structure learning.
2.4 Summary. By assuming a generic (Markovian) form for the genera-
tive model, it is straightforward to derive Bayesian updates that clarify the
interrelationships among perception, planning (i.e., policy selection), and
learning. In brief, the agent first infers the hidden states under each policy
that it entertains. It then evaluates the evidence for each policy based on
observed outcomes and beliefs about future states. Posterior beliefs about
each policy are then used to select the next action. The ensuing outcomes
are used in conjunction with combinations of expected hidden states to ac-
cumulate experience and learn contingencies or model parameters. Figure
2 (right) shows the functional anatomy implied by the belief updating and
mean-field approximation in Figure 1. Table 1 lists the sources of uncer-
tainty encoded by (expected) variational free energy and the behaviors en-
tailed by its minimization. As noted in section 1, this formalism provides
a nice ontology for perception, planning, and learning where planning or
policy selection has distinct novelty, information, and goal-seeking com-
ponents (driven by novelty, salience, and extrinsic value, respectively). We
will use this formalism in the next section to illustrate the behavioral (and
electrophysiological) responses that attend rule learning.
3 Curiosity and Learning
The first question is why human beings devote so much time and effort
to the acquisition of knowledge (Berlyne, 1954).
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The (rule-learning) paradigm considered in this section is sufficiently
difficult to challenge audiences but simple enough for us to unpack for-
mally. Its agenda is to illustrate curiosity in terms of pursuing policies that
afford novelty and the epistemic learning that ensues. The paradigm in-
volves three input modalities (what, where, and feedback) and four sets of
hidden states that generate these outcomes—two encoding contextual fac-
tors (rule and color) and two hidden states that can be controlled (where and
choice; see Figure 3).
In brief, artificial subjects could fixate or attend to a fixation point or one
of three cue locations. They were told that the color of the central cue spec-
ified a rule that would enable them to report the correct color (red, green, or
blue) with a button press (red, green, blue, or undecided). They were told to
report the correct color as accurately as possible after looking at three cues
or fewer. The rule the subjects had to discover was as follows: the color of
the central cue specifies the location of the correct color. For example, if the
subject sees red in the center, the correct color is on the left. When demon-
strating this task to audiences we usually say something like:
On each trial, we will present three colored dots, arranged around a cen-
tral fixation point. Your task is to choose the correct color. The dots will
be red, blue, or green, and dots of the same color can appear together. All
we will tell you is that there is a rule that enables you to identify the cor-
rect color on every trial—and that this rule is indicated by the color of the
central dot. Tomake things interesting, you can see only one dot at a time,
and we expect a decision after you have looked at three dots. Here is the
first trial, which color do you think is correct?
Clearly, we did not instruct our synthetic subject verbally. These instruc-
tions were conveyed via prior beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes and
prior preferences over a feedbackmodality. These prior preferences ensured
that the subject believed that she was unlikely to be wrong and that she was
highly likely to decide after the third epoch (i.e., she was likely to comply
with task instructions, even if this entailed choosing thewrong color). These
prior beliefs were coded in terms of negative value (i.e., Cost) in a feedback
modality; m = 3, with three levels (undecided, right, and wrong):
Cmτ = − lnP(omτ ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
4 omτ = wrong : ∀τ > 0,m = 3
8 omτ = undecided : ∀τ > 3,m = 3
0 otherwise
(3.1)
In addition to the (visual) color and (auditory) feedback modalities, subjects
also received a (proprioceptive) feedback signaling where they were cur-
rently looking. Here, τ indicates the number of saccades or sampled cues in
each trial.
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The hidden state space induced by the above instructions has four fac-
tors: the subject knew that there were three rules; three correct colors (red,
green, or blue); where they were looking (left, center, right, or fixation); and
their choice (red, green, blue, or undecided). We equipped subjects with six
actions: they could look at (or attend to) any of the cue locations without
making a choice, or they could return to the fixation point and report their
chosen color. In these simulations, policies were very simple and comprised
the past sequence of actions plus one of the six actions above. (See Figure 3
for a schematic depiction of the implicit hidden state space.)
The transitionmatriceswere also simple. The first two are identitymatri-
ces, because the context (rule and color) states do not change within a trial.
In what follows, each trial begins with a new set of cues and comprises a
sequence of epochs, where an epoch corresponds to the belief updating fol-
lowing each new observation (e.g., saccadic eyemovement). The remaining
(where and choice) probability transitionmatrices depend on action, where
the action invariably changes the hidden state to where the subject looks or
the choice she makes:
B1,2i j (u) =
{
1 i = j,∀u
0 i = j,∀u.
B3,4i j (u) =
{
1 i = u,∀ j
0 i = u,∀ j. (3.2)
Finally, prior beliefs about the initial stateswere uniformdistributions apart
from the sampled location and choice, which was always looking at the
fixation point prior to making a choice Dn = [0, . . . , 0, 1].
The only outstanding parameters of the generative model are the con-
centration parameters of the likelihood Am that link hidden states and
outcomes. The agent effectively knew the mapping to where and feedback
outcomes, in the sense that we made the concentration parameters high for
the correct contingencies (with a value of 128) and zero elsewhere. In other
words, the agents knew that feedback depended on choosing the correct
color. Furthermore, we used informative concentration parameters to tell
the subject that each of the three rules determined the color of the central
cue. However, the agents did not know how the rule determined outcomes.
This ignorance corresponds to uniform concentration parameters (of one)
in the mapping between the correct color and the color seen at each loca-
tion, under all three levels of the rule. The important parts of the resulting
likelihood array are shown in Figure 3 (right inset panel). Here, we have
tiled matrices mapping from the correct color (red, green, blue) to the vi-
sual outcome (red, green, blue, gray) for each location sampled (columns)
and rule (rows). This arrangement reveals the contingencies generating out-
comes. For example, if the agent is looking at the central location, she will
see a unique color under each rule (middle column: red, green, and blue for
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each of the three rules). Although the color sampled at the central location
signifies the rule for this trial, the subject has no concept of what this rule
means (see the uniform priors on either side of the central fixation in Fig-
ure 3). This means that the subject believes, a priori, there is no relationship
between the correct color and the color observed.
This completes our specification of the subject’s generative model. An
important aspect of this formulation is that we were able to transcribe task
instructions or intentional set into prior beliefs. This suggests that one can
regard task instructions as a way of inducing prior beliefs in an experimen-
tal setting. After instilling these prior beliefs, the synthetic subject knows
quite a lot about the structure of the problem but nothing about its so-
lution. In other words, she knows the number of hidden states and their
levels and mappings between some hidden states and others. However,
this knowledge is not sufficient to avoid surprising outcomes: making mis-
takes. Notice that we have been able to specify a fairly complete model of
a paradigm, including where subjects look, when they expect to respond,
and the sensory modalities entailed. This may appear to be overkill; how-
ever, it allows us to make specific predictions about behavior that can be
tested empirically. Furthermore, it shows howpurposeful, epistemic behav-
ior can emerge under minimal assumptions. In what follows, we will see
abstract problem solving and rule learning emerge from the minimization
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of expected free energy (i.e., expected surprise or uncertainty) under prior
beliefs that make indecisive or erroneous choices surprising.
3.1 The Rule. Hitherto, we have just specified the generative model
used by an agent. Clearly, to generate outcomes, we have to specify the
true generative process. This is identical to the generative model with one
exception: the mapping from states to outcomes contains the causal struc-
ture or rule that the subject will learn. As noted, the actual rule used to
generate outcomes is as follows: the rule (left, center, right) specifies the lo-
cation of the correct color. For example, if the subject sees red in the center,
the correct color is on the left. However, if she sees green in the center, the
correct color is in the center, which is always green. The corresponding part
Figure 3: Graphical representation of the generative model (Left) The Bayesian
network shows the conditional dependencies implied by the generative model
in Figure 1. The variables in open circles constitute (hyper) priors, while the
blue circles contain random variables. This format shows how outcomes are
generated from hidden states that evolve according to probabilistic transitions,
which depend on policies. The probability of a particular policy being selected
depends on its expected free energy. The left panels show the particular hidden
states and outcomemodalities used tomodel rule learning. Here, there are three
output modalities comprising colored visual cues (what), proprioceptive cues
signaling the direction of gaze (where), and (auditory) cues providing feedback
(feedback). These three sorts of outcomes are generated by the interactions among
four hidden states or factors: an abstract rule indicating the location of an infor-
mative color cue (rule); the correct color (colour), where attention or saccadic eye
movements are directed (where); and a (manual) response (choice). Hidden states
interact to specify outcomes in eachmodality. In other words, each combination
of hidden states has an associated column in the likelihood array that specifies
the relative likelihood of outcomes in each modality. For example, if the rule is
left, the correct color is red, and the subject is looking at the left cue, the what
outcome will be red and the where outcome will be left. (Right) The panel on the
upper right shows an example of a trial, where a subject looks from the starting
position to the central location, sees a red cue, and subsequently looks to the left.
After she has seen a green cue, she knows the correct color and returns to the
start position, while indicating her choice (green). The “?” denotes an undecided
choice state (and feedback). The matrices (lower left panel) show the likelihood
mapping between hidden states and (color) outcomes assumed, a priori, (right)
and used to generate actual outcomes (left). These matrices show the likelihood
mapping from hidden states to what outcomes—theA array for the first or what
modality. This is a five-dimensional array, of which four dimensions are shown
under the undecided level of the choice factor. In otherwords, these are the contin-
gencies in play until a decision is made. These parameters are shown as a block
matrix with 3 × 3 blocks (rule times where). Each block shows the 4 × 3 matrix
mapping the correct color to the outcome. (See Figure 7 for further details.)
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of the likelihood mapping (under the undecided state) is shown in Figure 3
(left inset panel). In contrast to the prior beliefs, the true likelihoods mean
that if one is looking to the left, the observed color maps to the correct color
under the left rule, and similarly when looking to the right. This true like-
lihood also contains some redundancy. For example, if the subject looks at
the central cue when the correct color is red, she will still see a green cue.
However, this combination of hidden states never occurs because, a posteri-
ori, a central green cue means the correct color is green (and this is encoded
in the likelihood mapping under decided states). It should be noted that
the (synthetic) subject does not “know” about these contingencies in an ex-
plicit or even subpersonal sense. These contingencies are encoded in model
(concentration) parameters that can be associated with synaptic efficacy or
connection strengths in the brain.
The rule above may sound simple, but it introduces interesting context
sensitivity or interactions among the hidden factors causing outcomes. For
example, the outcome depends on a two-way interaction between the cor-
rect color and where the subject is looking, but only when the rule is right
or left. The subject has to learn these contingencies by accumulating co-
incidences of inferred states and outcomes. However, this is not a simple
problem because agents do not have complete knowledge about hidden
states and therefore do not know which states are responsible for generat-
ing outcomes. Imagine you had to identify these interactions by designing
a multifactorial experiment. You would then manipulate hidden states and
record the outcomes. However, there is a problem: you do not know the
hidden states (because they are hidden from direct observation). In other
words, our synthetic subject has to learn the parameters, while inferring
the hidden states. So how does she fare using active inference?
Figure 4 shows the results of simulating 32 trials, where each trial com-
prises six epochs in which the subject can sample a new cue or make a
choice. The upper two panels summarize performance in terms of poste-
rior expectations over policies (top panel) and the final outcomes (second
panel). The colored dots indicate the rule for each trial (upper panel) and the
final outcomes (second panel). A key point to observe is that the final out-
come is usually correct. This is because the subject is allowed to change her
mind after making a mistake. These choices are based on posterior expecta-
tions about policies that are initially ambiguous and become more precise
with learning. By the end of each trial, only the last three policies are enter-
tained (choosing red, green, or blue). In the first trial, two options are enter-
tained with equal probability, but by the 10th trial, any ambiguity appears
to be resolved. After the 14th trial, performance becomes perfect. Although
there is no definitive phase transition or aha moment, these results suggest
that the rule is dawning on the agent.
The lower panels illustrate the implicit transition from ignorance to un-
derstanding after trial 14 (highlighted in blue). The second and third panels
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Figure 4: Simulated responses during learning. This figure reports the behav-
ioral responses during 32 successive trials. The first panel shows the first (rule)
hidden state as colored circles and subsequent policy selection (in image format)
over the policies considered. Darker means more probable. There are six poli-
cies corresponding to a saccade to each of the three locations (without making
a choice) and three choices (while moving back to the starting location). These
policy expectations reflect the fact that at the end of the trial, a choice is always
made with greater or lesser confidence, as reflected in the relative probability of
the final three policies. The second panel reports the final outcomes (encoded
by colored circles) and performance measures in terms of expected cost (see
equation 3.1 and Table 1), summed over time (black bars). The red bars indicate
mistakes (i.e., the incorrect color is chosen at some point).The lower two panels
report the free energy at the end of each trial and fluctuations in confidence as
learning proceeds. The cyan region indicates the onset of confident and correct
responses.
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show the free energy over trials and associated confidence in behavior: π · π
(i.e., the negative entropy of beliefs about policies, where entropy scores
uncertainty). Note that free energy is the difference between accuracy and
complexity. The increase in confidence therefore reflects a dialectic between
complexity and accuracy. Here, the increase in confidence (decrease in en-
tropy over policies) is more than offset by the increase in accuracy afforded
by confident behavior. This is reflected by the progressive decrease in free
energy that, unlike confidence, shows trial-to-trial fluctuations. The persis-
tent increase in confidence is underwritten by epistemic behavior that re-
solves both uncertainty and ambiguity.
Figure 5 shows the expectations over states and action as a function of
epochs within the first trial (see Figure 5A) and the penultimate trial, after
rule learning (see Figure 5B). The four panels on the left show the expec-
tations over the four marginal hidden states, while the two panels on the
right show the equivalent expectations over action. Note that there are two
actions that control transitions among hidden states: the where factor and
the choice factor. The cyan dots show the true hidden states and action se-
lected. In the first trial, the agent first looks to the center, then looks to the
left, stays there for one epoch, and then makes two incorrect choices. Con-
versely, in the later trial, the agent looks at the center, and the right and then
chooses correctly.
The key point these results illustrate is the apparent attractiveness of
right and left locations after the first saccade, which disappears in later tri-
als. It is this behavior that is driven by novelty (see equation 2.2). To under-
stand the importance of this behavior, it is useful to realize that the right and
left locations are inherently aversive because they deliver ambiguous out-
comes.Normally, an agentwould avoid these locations in the sameway that
you and I might avoid a noisy restaurant or ambiguous invitation. How-
ever, the naive agent does not know these locations are ambiguous—and
this is a known unknown that affords an opportunity for the agent to fill in
her knowledge gaps. Crucially, after rule learning, the subject knows that
the left location is ambiguous and avoids it (compare the probabilities in
the upper right panels in Figures 5A and 5B). She therefore looks immedi-
ately to the informative location, enabling her to retrospectively infer that
the correct color is blue (compare the upper left panels in Figures 5A and
5B). This inference is based on Bayesian belief updating, which we now
consider more closely.
3.2 The Neural Correlates of Cognizance. A close inspection of the
(synthetic) neuronal updating—underwriting the behavior above—shows
a profound difference in the temporal structure of evoked responses. Fig-
ure 6 shows the activity of units encoding the expectation of the hidden
color state over six epochs as a function of time. The results are shown for
the same (before and after learning) trials of the previous figure. The upper
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Figure 5: Simulated exploration. This figure reports the belief updating behind
the behavior shown in Figure 4 for an early trial (A) and after the rule has been
learned (B). (A) Each panel shows expectations in image format, with black
representing 100% probability. For the hidden states (left panels), each of the
four factors is shown separately, with the true states indicated by cyan dots.
Here, there are five saccades, and expectations are shown after completion of
the last saccadic, which means that, retrospectively, the agent believes it started
in a right rule context (hidden states—rule) and, despite making two mistakes,
is able to infer the correct color by elimination (hidden states—color). The two
panels on the right report the equivalent expectations about action for the two
controllable hidden states (where and choice). The sequence of sampling (in-
ferred and selected action—where) indicates that the subject first interrogated
the center (observing a blue cue), looked to the left, and thenmade two incorrect
choices (see Figure 6). (B)However, after learning, the subject ismuchmore con-
fident aboutwhere to look because she now knows that the color of the right cue
will reduce uncertainty about the correct color. The important aspect of these re-
sults is that prior to learning, the right and left locations are equally attractive—
and more attractive than the (initially sampled) central location (highlighted
with red circles). This is despite the fact these locations do not reduce risk or
uncertainty (because the agent does not know the meaning of the cues in these
locations). However, the subject does know that she is ignorant and can resolve
this ignorance by exposing herself to novel outcomes.
panels show belief updates as a raster image (left) and as functions of peri-
stimulus time (right). The raster highlights the fact that there are explicit
representations of the six epochs at each point in time and that these expec-
tations are updated over time. Thismeans that the blocks of the raster above
the leading diagonal encode the past, while the blocks below the leading di-
agonal encode the future.
The key observation here is that the onset of discriminatory responses
is much earlier after learning than before. This is due to—and only to—
learning the mapping between hidden states and consequences, enabling
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Figure 6: Simulated electrophysiological responses. This figure shows expec-
tations about hidden states for the same two trials illustrated in the previous
figure—before learning (A) and after learning (B). (A) The upper left panel
shows the activity (firing rate) of units encoding the correct color in image
(raster) format over the six intervals between five saccades. These responses
are organized such that the upper rows encode the probability of alternative
states in the first epoch, with subsequent epochs in lower rows. In other words,
the top row shows the expectations about the three hidden (color) states at the
beginning of the trial and how these expectations evolve over time. Conversely,
the first column shows expectations about the three colors at successive time
points in the future. The plot to the right of the image presents the same infor-
mation to illustrate the evidence accumulation and the resulting disambigua-
tion of context. These values are expectations about hidden states described by
the first equations in Figure 2 and can be interpreted as neuronal firing rates of
units encoding expectations. The associated local field potentials for these units
(i.e., the rate of change of neuronal firing) are shown in the lower plot. The in-
sert (lower left) shows the sequence of moves and decisions. Here, the subject
makes a saccade to the center location and then looks to the left and finally back
to the center, at which point she makes a choice (green), which elicits the wrong
feedback. She then changes her mind and (incorrectly) tries red. However, the
correct color is blue (circled in magenta). This behavior can be contrasted with
the responses on the right (after learning). (B) Here, the correct color is identi-
fied on the first choice. Crucially, this is based on precise expectations about the
correct color that have been accumulating since the second saccade, as reflected
in the simulated neuronal responses.
the agent to infer the correct color after the second saccade to the (infor-
mative) location. The lower panels show the corresponding behaviors (left)
and simulated local field potentials or event-related potentials (right). These
are simply the first derivatives of the responses in the upper panels. In
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summary, after the rule has dawned on the agent, she knows exactly where
to find unambiguous information to make precise inferences about the un-
derlying context and veridical choices. In terms of simulated electrophysi-
ology, this means representations of latent states of the world are activated
much earlier during evidence accumulation, after the meaning of cues has
been disambiguated through epistemic learning. These simulations are not
inconsistent with event-related potential and fMRI studies of insight, re-
viewed in the discussion (e.g., Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Mai, Luo, Wu, &
Luo, 2004; Bowden et al., 2005).
4 Structure Learning and Bayesian Model Reduction
The second question is why, out of the infinite range of knowable items in
the universe, certain pieces of knowledge are more ardently sought and
more readily retained than others (Berlyne, 1954).
The previous section illustrated the role of novelty in driving curious be-
havior and the epistemic learning it elicits. In this section, we turn to a
different sort of learning: learning the structure of a likelihood model af-
ter evidence has been accumulated. The previous simulations suggest that
there are behavioral and electrophysiological correlates of curiosity in epis-
temic learning. However, there was no clear homologue of an aha moment
or an instance of revelation associated with insight. To move closer to ”the
perception of what passes in a man’s own mind,” this section considers
Bayesian model selection and structure learning as a metaphor of under-
standing and self-knowledge, in the sense of Locke (Nimbalkar, 2011). It
considers the fact that subjects not only have prior beliefs about the param-
eters of their models but also prior beliefs about models per se; for exam-
ple, they know there are rules. In what follows, we will see that this prior
knowledge about models naturally induces abductive reasoning, when the
models themselves minimize variational free energy.
Loosely speaking, one can associate awareness of the world with infer-
ence about its hidden states based on a generative model and knowledge
with learning model parameters. Here, we turn to a third level of optimiza-
tion that minimizes free energy with respect to the model per se. Select-
ing models that have the greatest evidence (least free energy) is known as
Bayesian model selection. This procedure furnishes models that, on aver-
age, provide the best explanation for the data at hand. As such, it can be
thought of as inference to the best explanation (Harman, 1965), or abduc-
tive reasoning.
We focus on a particular but ubiquitous form of Bayesian model selec-
tion; Bayesianmodel reduction. Essentially, Bayesianmodel reduction eval-
uates the evidence of reduced forms of a parent or full model by eliminating
redundant parameters. Crucially, Bayesian model reduction can be applied
to the posterior beliefs after the data have been assimilated. In other words,
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Bayesian model reduction is a post hoc optimization that refines current
beliefs based on alternative models that may provide potentially simpler
explanations (Friston & Penny, 2011). The alternative (reduced) models are
defined in terms of their priors—for example, a precise prior belief that
some parameters are zero. Heuristically, equation 2.1 shows that free en-
ergy is a complexity minus accuracy, where complexity is the divergence
between posterior and prior beliefs. Previously, we have focused on opti-
mizing free energy with respect to the (approximate) posterior as encoded
by its expectations.However,we can alsominimize free energywith respect
to the priors, thereby eliminating redundant parameters to reduce model
complexity.
Neurobiologically, this model optimization resembles mechanisms that
have been proposed during sleep. While awake, the brain learns causal
associations, through associative plasticity, that are embodied in an exu-
berance of synaptic connections. During sleep, redundant connections are
subsequently removed (Tononi & Cirelli, 2006) to minimize complexity and
free energy in the absence of any further sensory input (Hobson & Friston,
2012). In this setting, sleeping is literally a way of clearing one’s mind.
Technically, Bayesian model reduction is a generalization of ubiquitous
procedures in statistics, ranging from the Savage-Dickey ratio (Savage,
1954), through to classical F-tests in parametric statistics. In our context,
it reduces to something remarkably simple: by applying Bayes’ rules to full
and reduced models, it is straightforward to show that the change in free
energy can be expressed in terms of posterior concentration parameters a,
prior concentration parameters a, and the prior concentration parameters
that define a reduced or simpler model a’. Using B(·) to denote the beta
function, we get (see the appendix)
F = ln B(a) + ln B(a′) − ln B(a) − ln B(a + a′ − a). (4.1)
This equation returns the difference in free energywewould have observed
had we started observing outcomes with simpler prior beliefs. Clearly, to
engage with this form of free energy minimization, one has to have a space
of models or reduced priors to evaluate. This is the key feature of Bayesian
model reduction that lends it an abductive aspect: in otherwords, model se-
lection is ampliative, meaning that the conclusion goes beyond what could
otherwise be induced or inferred. This abductive characteristic rests on the
selection of competing hypotheses that are plausible. In other words, if I
know that my data were produced like this or like that, I can appeal to a
relatively small number of plausible explanations and implicitly exclude
a universe of alternative explanations (models), including the full model
used to acquire my knowledge. This ampliative aspect of Bayesian model
selection appeals to a hierarchical structuring of plausible explanations
such that each successive level provides broad (or abstract) constraints on
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plausible explanations for the level below; for example, at the highest level,
we may know there are a small number of plausible hypotheses and a
large number of implausible hypotheses. (See Navarro & Perfors, 2011, for
a discussion of this key issue in the context of sparse hypothesis or model
spaces.)
Tomake this process clear, consider the following example. If our subject
knows she is being asked to discover a rule, she knows that some combina-
tions of hidden states for each factor will be informative and others will not.
Therefore, under any particular combination of hidden states, there are only
two plausible contingencies: either all allowable outcomes are equally prob-
able, or there is a definitive outcome that constitutes part of the rule.One can
take this explanatory reduction (of model or hypothesis space) even further
based simply on the assumption that rules entail some form of symmetry
or invariance. For example, if the correct color red always generates a red
outcome, other levels of the same (color) hidden state will be informative
under a particular combination of the other hidden states.
This heuristic can be absorbed gracefully into the imperative tominimize
expected free energy. This is because expected free energy scores the ambi-
guity of a generative model. Therefore, prior beliefs about models based
on their expected free energy will necessarily favor unambiguous map-
pings between (latent) causes and consequences. In other words, in exactly
the same way that action selection minimizes ambiguity, when agents are
equipped with the latitude to optimize their models, model selection is re-
stricted to models whose plausibility is determined by their ability to dis-
ambiguate the causes of observed outcomes.
Figure 7 shows the results of applying Bayesian model reduction before
the 12th trial in the simulations above. In this example, we compared the
evidence for a full model (in which the correct color generated outcome
colors of equal probability) with reduced models in which the correct color
generated its own color (under each combination of the remaining hidden
states). These reduced models were specified by changing the prior counts
from 1 to 8 to specify a prior belief that the hidden color specified the out-
come more precisely. A comparison was performed under every combina-
tion of the remaining (three) hidden states. If there was positive evidence
for the reduced, simpler, or unambiguous model, the concentration param-
eters mediating uninformative outcomes were removed (by setting them to
zero) and the posterior concentration parameters (or counts) were assigned
to the remaining parameters.
The upper left panel of Figure 7 reproduces the true likelihood from
Figure 3. The upper right panel shows the full model that corresponds
to the agent’s prior beliefs. The equivalent posterior beliefs after 12 trials
are shown on the lower left. It is clear that the leading diagonal blocks of
the array may be better explained by an unambiguous one-to-one map-
ping between the hidden and outcome colors. Indeed, when we performed
Bayesian model comparison, the reduced model had more evidence than
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Figure 7: Structure learning. This figure shows the parameters (connection
strengths) that constitute the likelihood mapping from hidden states to what
outcomes—the A array for the first modality. This is a five-dimensional array,
of which four dimensions are shown under the undecided level of the choice fac-
tor. These parameters are shown as a block matrix with 3 × 3 blocks (rule times
where). Each block shows the 4 × 3 matrix mapping the correct color to the out-
come. (Upper left) These represent the true parameters or contingencies. When
the agent is looking at the center cue (middle column), the rule is uniquely spec-
ified by the color of the outcome. However, when the agent is looking to the left
or right (left and right columns), the outcome depends on only the correct color
if the agent is looking toward the left (when the rule is left) or to the right (when
the rule is right). This context sensitivity is modeled by the diagonal matrices on
the upper left and lower right. In all other situations, any color could be seen.
(Upper right) These are the corresponding expectations of a naive agent. Note
that the diagonal matrices have disappeared and there are no beliefs about the
relationship between the correct and observed colors. (Lower left) After 12 tri-
als, the agent has accumulated sufficient experience to acquire knowledge about
the (context-sensitive) interactions and knows that observed and correct colors
predict each other when, and only when, looking in the appropriate location.
(Lower right) This knowledge is sufficient to recover the correct contingencies
following Bayesian model reduction (a period of sleep or reflection). Note that
the implicit model optimization removes redundant parameters (connections)
between the correct and observed colors, enabling more confident behavior.
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the full model, leading to the posterior parameterization on the lower right.
This has correctly removed redundant (off-diagonal) parameters from the
top left and bottom right blocks, thereby equipping the agent with the cor-
rect prior belief that when looking at the right or left locations (prior to
making a choice), the correct color unambiguously specifies the color that
will be seen.
Note that Bayesian model reduction or top-down structure learning is
not just a question of finding simple models with unambiguous contingen-
cies; it rests on finding the best balance between accuracy and complexity.
This meansmodel parameters will be pruned until further model reduction
compromises the model’s ability to explain accumulated evidence. This is
evident in the current simulations, which eschew very simple models that
are not fit for purpose in relation to the contingencies generating outcomes
(e.g., models with unambiguous outcomes in all contexts). This reflects Ein-
stein’s famous assertion: ”Everything should bemade as simple as possible,
but not simpler.”
Figure 8A shows the ensuing performance after Bayesian model reduc-
tion. This uses the same format as the lower panels in Figure 4, with the
free energy in the upper panel and confidence in the lower panel. The dot-
ted lines reproduce the results from Figure 4, while the solid and broken
lines show the improvement following Bayesian model reduction. Indeed,
performance becomes perfect (and confident) after trial 12. The difference
between the solid and broken lines rests on an additional optimization that
speaks to the difference between REM (rapid eyemovement) and non-REM
sleep, which we now consider.
4.1 Bayesian Model Reduction and Sleep. In the example above, we
eliminated redundant parameters when there was positive evidence for the
reduced model. Quantitatively, this corresponds to F ≤ −3. This corre-
sponds to an odds ratio or Bayes factor of exp(−3) ≈ 0.05. In other words,
strong evidence for the reduced model relative to a full model means that
the reduced model is about 20 times more likely (Penny, 2012). Neurobi-
ologically, removing redundant parameters corresponds to a synaptic re-
gression of the sort implicated in synaptic homoeostasis (Tononi & Cirelli,
2006). For example, if we consider the concentration parameters as encod-
ing synaptic efficacy, connections mapping from expectations of hidden
states to predicted outcomes are eliminatedwith a nuancedwinner-take-all-
like mechanism. Heuristically, if one connection is sufficiently larger than
all others, then the other connections are lost. Otherwise, all connections
remain in play. One could associate this synaptic regression with the ho-
moeostatic mechanisms thought to occur during non-REM sleep (Tononi &
Cirelli, 2006). What about REM sleep?
Because we have eliminated model parameters, it is necessary to reeval-
uate the posteriors under the new (reduced) priors. Usually this would be
done analytically (see the appendix). However, here, we have not simply
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Figure 8: Performance and sleep. This figure illustrates the performance over
32 trials with andwithout Bayesian model reduction (or sleep), and instruction.
The results of a single simulation are shown in panel A, while panel B summa-
rizes the results over 64 agents. (A) The upper panels show performance using
the same format as in Figure 4 in terms of free energy (upper panel) and con-
fidence (second panel). The blue lines report the simulations with sleep—REM
(solid) and non-REM (broken)—while the red lines are without sleep (and re-
capitulate the results in Figure 4). The key thing to note here is that a period of
sleep (before the 12th trial) markedly improves performance over subsequent
trials. This is indicated by the arrows highlightingmistakesmade in the absence
of sleep (the pink stars are correct responses prior to sleep, while the blue stars
indicate correct responses after sleep). (B) These results illustrate performance
averaged over 64 subjects, each performing 32 trial sessions. The upper right
panel shows the probability of a correct response (pooled over successive tri-
als), where the gray bars correspond to normal performance and the black bars
show the improvement when subjects engage in Bayesian model reduction (re-
flection) after each trial. The middle panels show the average free energy and
confidence over subjects with (blue) and without (red) reflection. The shaded
blue area corresponds to the 90% confidence interval. The lower panel shows
the corresponding results for each subject by scoring their mistakes (black bars)
as a function of trials with Bayesian model reduction. The dots record points of
abduction or Bayesianmodel reduction (veridical, magenta; superstitious or in-
correct, blue). (C) These panels show the free energy and confidence with (blue)
and without (red) instruction (i.e., with and without informative priors over
models). The right panel shows that performance is perfect following instruc-
tion with a high level of confidence (pink stars). The blue stars indicate when
mistakes were made without instruction.
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increased the prior of one connection over others;we have actually removed
connections. This means it is necessary to reevaluate the posterior concen-
tration parameters under the new model. One obvious way of doing this
is to rehearse the same sequence of outputs under the new model. This
means that the process of Bayesian belief updating its repeated but using
outcomes that have already been sampled or generated de novo with the
same statistics (Louie & Wilson, 2001; Dragoi & Tonegawa, 2014; Pezzulo,
van der Meer, Lansink, & Pennartaz, 2014). Neurobiologically, this implies
several processes. First, we have to update expectations about hidden states
(e.g., encoded in hippocampal and parietal systems) in the absence of new
sensory information. Furthermore, this optimization rests on active infer-
ence and, in this example, saccadic eye movements. In short, we have a
mathematical metaphor for hippocampal dependent learning (Walker &
Stickgold, 2004) during sleep (Rasch, Buechel, Gais, & Born, 2007) with an
emphasis on procedural memory in REM sleep (Marshall & Born, 2007).
The solid lines in Figure 8A correspond to performance using posterior
parameter estimates (synaptic connection strengths) after sleep-like reeval-
uation. The broken lines show a (similar) performance when we approx-
imate this process by assigning posterior concentration parameters to the
surviving connection (as above). It can be seen that there is no difference
in terms of performance or confidence, with no systematic difference in the
free energy or expected free energy. We therefore use the (computationally
more expedient) approximation in what follows.
4.2 Simulating the Aha Moment. The previous simulations explored
the notion that Bayesian model reduction and the minimization of com-
plexity might occur during sleep. This “clears the mind” such that after
a brief nap, our subject has a clear and simple understanding of the con-
tingencies and can choose more efficiently and confidently. Crucially, this
Bayesian model reduction introduces a qualitative change before and after
sleep that speaks to a qualitative transition to a state of knowing (and using
what you know) associated with an aha moment. In what follows, we use
Bayesian model reduction to redistribute posterior concentration parame-
ters as above; however, here we associate this post hoc model optimiza-
tion not with sleep but with reflection. In brief, we allowed the subject to
reflect on each trial, thereby performing online Bayesian model reduction.
The aimof these simulationswas to show thatmodel selection can be imple-
mented continuously (as opposed to sporadically during sleep) and leads
to qualitative transitions in the generativemodel and subsequent inference.
It is these transitions we associate with aha moments. Indeed, in the rodent
hippocampus, one sees (sharp wave-ripple associated) sequences not only
during sleep but whenever a rat is disengaged from exploratory or forag-
ing behavior (and associated theta rhythms), such as during short rests or
grooming after consuming a reward (Pezzulo et al., 2014).
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Figure 8B shows the results of repeating the above simulations with 64
artificial subjects, each exposed to a different sequence of rules and cues.
The upper panel shows the results with and without abductive Bayesian
model reduction following each trial, in black and gray, respectively (the
performance has been slightly smoothed to reveal the underlying trends).
One can see a marked improvement in performance, particularly after the
fifth trial. The benefits of abductive reduction mean that nearly all subjects
attain 100%performance at around the 10th trial (see below). Chance perfor-
mance here is about 30%. The associated changes in free energy and confi-
dence are shown in the middle panels in terms of the average over subjects
(blue line) and 90% confidence intervals based on the standard deviation
over subjects. The red lines show the averages without reflection.
The lower panel in Figure 8B shows individual performances, with each
subject along one row and mistakes shown in black. The colored dots cor-
respond to qualitative changes in the model following abductive Bayesian
model reduction. The magenta dots record a veridical model reduction us-
ing a model space that allowed unambiguous (one-to-one) mappings be-
tween the correct color and outcome that were deployed unambiguously
over combinations of remaining hidden states. In detail, we considered
models in which the correct color specified a unique outcome. Similarly,
this mapping was specified uniquely by each rule over locations. This cre-
ated 36 models where each of six different (unique) mappings between the
three correct colors and outcomes was arranged according to six different
(unique) combinations of rule and location. Because all of these models
provide an unambiguous explanation for causal structure in the paradigm,
they enable ampliative inference, enabling rules to be “recognized” after a
handful of trials. This exploration of model space is slightly more exhaus-
tive and sophisticated than the sleep example above. Here, we compared 36
(6 × 6) models with the full (ambiguous) model, as opposed to comparing
ambiguous and unambiguous (what × color) models for each of the 36 (3 ×
3 × 4) combinations of hidden states (rule ×where × choice).
The blue dots (in three subjects) correspond to decreases in the correla-
tion between the priors and true model structure that occur when an infor-
mative color mapping is abducted in the wrong context, for example, when
looking to the left under the center rule (in which case the outcome is un-
informative). These superstitiousmodels illustrate the trade-off between the
ampliative benefits of abduction (going judiciously beyond the evidence
at hand) and a susceptibility to superstitious beliefs that arise from chance
occurrences that are consistent with prior beliefs. These false insights are
associated with persistently poor behavior (see Figure 8B).
These results also show profound intersubject variability. Many subjects
attain perfect performance after a handful of trials and early aha moments;
however, some agents experience aha moment only after 10 trials. Strictly
speaking, this is not an attribute of agents; it is an attribute of the outcomes
sampled. This follows from the fact that all the agents are identical, starting
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with the same priors and responding deterministically in their active infer-
ence. This highlights a key aspect of active inference: there are no random
or stochastic aspects. Everything that changes does so to minimize varia-
tional free energy, in accord with Hamilton’s principle of least action. This
should be contrasted with sampling schemes and reinforcement learning
that would take a very long time to learn this rule (see section 5).
A key prediction arises from associating Bayesian model selection with
abductive processes: an aha moment is necessarily subpersonal (i.e., per-
taining to a biophysical level below the personal or conscious level). In
other words, one can never remember or articulate abductive reasoning at
the level of the model in question. This is because optimizing a model is
fundamentally different from modeling an optimization. This subpersonal
aspect is consistent with the physiological mediation of the abductive rea-
soning afforded by Bayesian model selection during sleep (and reflection
or mind wandering) (Bar, Aminoff, Mason, & Fenske, 2007), which is me-
diated by synaptic regression and competition (e.g., (Holzel et al., 2011). In
other words, when things click into place, we have no explicit (generative)
model of the underlying process. Having said this, it is possible that agents
have “inmind” an explicit model space that theywill test from time to time.
This introduces a further hierarchical level to generative models, where the
higher level constitutes a space of alternative models or hypotheses. In the
last example, we used 36 models. An interesting corollary of possessing a
portfolio or lexicon of potential models is that the results of abductive rea-
soning can be communicated to other agents, in terms of prior beliefs about
models, provided all agents possess the same the lexicon or model space
(Friston & Frith, 2015). We illustrate this briefly in the final simulation.
4.3 Model Reduction and Communication. We have emphasized the
autodidactic nature of structure learning with Bayesian model reduction.
However, exactly the same (variational) optimization principles apply
when using reducedmodels as priors in other naive agents. In other words,
an important aspect of inference over models is that the conclusions can be
transcribed or communicated to update the prior beliefs of others, such as
children or other naıve conspecifics (Frith, 2010). Note that this is not in-
structed or supervised learning in the sense that transcribing reduced priors
does not tell a naıve agent what has been learned—just what is learnable.
In other words, communicating posterior beliefs about models is distinct
from communicating posterior beliefs about model parameters.
To illustrate the potency of good prior knowledge in a multi-agent or
prosocial setting, we created a new agent and equipped it with the re-
duced priors of an experienced agent (from Figure 4). Unsurprisingly, the
naive subject performed perfectly, with maximum confidence from the first
trial (see Figure 8C). This perfect performance does not mean the agent
has consolidated its received wisdom (accumulated concentration parame-
ters), but her inferences are sufficiently precise to enable prior beliefs (about
2666 K. Friston et al.
responding correctly) to be fulfilled. This simple illustration does not ad-
dress some more fundamental issues of neuronal hermeneutics (Frith &
Wentzer, 2013). This is because we have assumed that the priors from the
experienced agent can be received by the naıve agent. This presupposes
that there is a shared space of hypotheses and model spaces that enable
the naive agent to properly implement received priors. This raises the in-
teresting issue of what we communicate to each other: Is this knowledge or
meta-knowledge conveyed in the form of prior beliefs (Shea et al., 2014).
4.4 Summary. In summary, we have created a synthetic subject that has
all the hallmarks of a “good scientist.” She starts off with prior beliefs that
shewill, after a period of sampling data, report her conclusions—and not be
wrong. These are the only beliefs necessary to specify behavior; everything
else follows fromminimizing expected free energy. First, (sensory) data are
sampled to resolve ambiguity about the current state of the world while at
the same time reducing the risk of making a mistake. Furthermore, exper-
iments are performed carefully to resolve ignorance about how outcomes
are generated by latent or hidden causes. Having acquired data, the “good
scientist” reflects on what she knows (and perhaps sleeps on it), implicitly
testing plausible hypotheses of a progressively simpler (less complex and
less ambiguous) nature that could provide an accurate account of the data
at hand. Equipped with a more generalizable (generative) model, which
conforms to Occam’s principle, the active inference process starts again,
providing more evidence that the agent is what she thinks she is: a good
scientist (cf. the self-evidencing brain; Hohwy, 2016).
5 Discussion
We have presented an active inference formulation of curiosity (epistemic)
and insightful (structural) learning in the setting of abstract rule learning.
The resulting behavior rests on two generalizations of free energy mini-
mization: the first is the inclusion of beliefs about model parameters in the
expected free energy that induces novelty. This leads to a form of epistemic
behavior (curiosity) that goes beyond resolving uncertainty about the con-
text in which an agent is operating, to resolving ignorance about whether
uncertainty can be resolved. The second advance pursues a hierarchical
theme by noting that free energy can also be reduced online (reflection) or
offline (sleep) through Bayesian model reduction. Together, these processes
produce inferential behavior that acquires knowledge of lawful structure in
the sensorium and points to the role of self-improvement and (subpersonal)
introspection in making the most of that knowledge.
5.1 The Empirical Correlates of Insight. From a neuroscience perspec-
tive, our simulations suggest the following correlates of insight:
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• A sustained increase in performance accuracy after epistemic learn-
ing
• A concomitant increase in posterior confidence about action or
choices
• Apredilection for sampling novel cues, which abates with experience
• A profound reduction in the latency of evoked neuronal responses,
when subjects know the meaning of cues (or have learned a rule);
equivalently, an increase in the amplitude of event-related responses
to initial cues in a sequence, when their implications for subsequent
outcomes can be inferred (see Figure 6)
• An increase in the above markers of awareness when agents are al-
lowed to reflect on their choices after each trial
Perhaps the empirically most relevant prediction is the reduction in the
latency of evoked responses following the acquisition of insight. Several
studies speak to this prediction. For example, event-related potential stud-
ies of Chinese riddles (with and without insight) implicate the anterior cin-
gulate cortex: ”Dipole analysis localized the generator of the N380 in the
ACC. N380 therefore probably reflects an ‘Aha!’ effect, and the ACC gen-
erator may be involved in the breaking of mental set” (Mai et al., 2004).
It is tempting to associate the notion of ”breaking of mental set” with the
process of Bayesian model reduction in the sense that both entail a dissem-
bling of prior constructs in the search of better explanations. Complemen-
tary fMRI studies of verbal insight have “revealed increased activity in the
right hemisphere anterior superior temporal gyrus for insight relative to
noninsight solutions” (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). These findings speak to a
hemispheric lateralization of the neuronal correlates of insight; see Bowden
et al., 2005, for discussion. Interestingly, ”The same region was active dur-
ing initial solving efforts. Scalp electroencephalogram recordings revealed
a sudden burst of high-frequency (gamma-band) neural activity in the same
area beginning 0.3 s prior to insight” (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). Findings
of this sort suggest that there may be neuronal correlates of (subpersonal)
reflection that rest on short-term plasticity in regions whose intrinsic con-
nectivity encodes likelihood mappings.
The short-term plasticity implicit in Bayesianmodel reduction fits nicely
with the role of restructuring in insight. Insight entails “a mental restruc-
turing that leads to a sudden gain of explicit knowledge allowing qualita-
tively changed behavior. Anecdotal reports on scientific discovery suggest
that pivotal insights can be gained through sleep. Sleep consolidates recent
memories and, concomitantly, could allow insight by changing their repre-
sentational structure” (Wagner, Gais, Haider, Verleger, & Born, 2004). Using
a cognitive task that required the learning of stimulus-response sequences,
Wagner et al. demonstrated an abrupt improvement in performance (reac-
tion times) following insight into an abstract rule underlying the sequen-
ces. Crucially, the prevalence of insight-dependent performance changes
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doubled following nocturnal sleep. The authors concluded ”that sleep, by
restructuring new memory representations, facilitates extraction of explicit
knowledge and insightful behavior” (Wagner et al., 2004). These findings
suggest that there may be an interesting interplay between Bayesian model
reduction in sleep (Tononi & Cirelli, 2006; Hobson & Friston, 2012) and the
waking (online) processes that we have associated with aha moments. The
facilitation of insight may not be limited to sleep. For example, spectral
analyses of resting EEG, prior to solving anagrams, again support right-
lateralized hemispheric asymmetry and ”reveal a relationship between
resting-state brain activity and [subsequent] problem-solving” (Kounios
et al., 2008).
5.2 Relationship to Formal Theories of Insight. The formulation of
insight offered by active inference inherits much from previous work. A
common theme here is the minimization of complexity implicit in finding
simpler explanations for the evidence we encounter—for example, ”People
may be surprised to notice certain regularities that hold in existing knowl-
edge they have had for some time. That is, they may learn without get-
ting new factual information. We argue that this can be partly explained
by computational complexity” (Aragones et al., 2005). This approach to
fact-free learning is closely related to the notion that an understanding
of the world entails active learning that affords compressibility, regular-
ity, and predictability (Schmidhuber, 2006). Technically, this compressibility
corresponds to reducing complexity and speaks to the intimate relation-
ship between variational free energy andminimum description or message
lengths (Hinton&vanCamp, 1993;Hinton&Zemel, 1993;Wallace&Dowe,
1999; Yedidia, Freeman, & Weiss, 2005). In brief, if (expected) free energy
comprises expected accuracy and expected complexity, then the minimiz-
ing expected free energy entails the minimization of expected complexity
(i.e., maximization of epistemic value), thereby furnishing more parsimo-
nious, nicely compressed explanations for the nature of the sampled world
(Schmidhuber, 2010).
Akey insight here is that structure or fact-free learning proceeds, by def-
inition, in the absence of new facts or evidence. This is important from the
perspective of free energy minimization because it means the only term in
play is complexity. In other words, in the absence of new data, the only way
that we can optimize our generative models is by making them simpler.3
This emphasizes the key role of complexity in Bayesian model selection
and structure learning. We have associated insight with Bayesian model
3
Although, as noted by our reviewers, agents could anticipate forthcoming data (or ex-
perience) and forearm themselves with more complicated (e.g., full) models. Indeed, one
could argue that evolution has endowed infants with over-parameterized (e.g., full) mod-
els that are subsequently pruned through epigenetics and experience-dependent plastic-
ity (i.e., learning).
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reduction of a full model. Bayesian model reduction is a particular form
of Bayesian model selection that represents a top-down approach, where
alternative models are distilled from a full model, much like a sculpture
is revealed by the artful removal of stone. This particular form of struc-
ture learning eludes challenging questions about how to develop models
in a bottom-up fashion. In other words, we have avoided many important
questions about the construction and exploration of model spaces in the
absence of a full model (Gershman & Niv, 2010; Navarro & Perfors, 2011;
Collins & Frank, 2013; Tervo et al., 2016). This calls on things like nonpara-
metric Bayesian methods that have been used to model cognitive control
over learning; e.g., (Collins & Koechlin, 2012; Collins & Frank, 2013) and
the emergence of goal codes (Stoianov, Genovesio, & Pezzulo, 2016). In-
deed, this theoretical line of thinking has enabled neuroimaging studies to
identify the functional (prefrontal cortical) anatomy of structure learning in
terms of ”hypothesis testing for accepting versus rejecting newly created
strategies” (Donoso et al., 2014).
The artificial insight in this article is exemplified within a particular
experimental task. This begs the question of whether human participants
would demonstrate the same sort of insight predicted by the model. For ex-
ample, category learningwork suggests that participants tend to use simple
regularities initially but then turn to more complex constructs after train-
ing (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1998). This speaks to interesting questions about
the implicit nature of model selection—in particular, the model or hypoth-
esis spaces from which the most apt models are selected. Technically this
would be treated as a greedy search problem—for example, selecting the
best among simple models and then considering simple models plus sys-
tematic (symmetric) exceptions. In our example, the simple models that
conformed to putative rules contained the true model, obviating the need
for a greedy search. Informal results (when asking audiences to perform
the above task) suggest people acquire insight after seven to eight trials.
This suggests that people are using prior knowledge about the nature of
rules to perform some sort of Bayesian model selection because just accu-
mulating experience in a Bayes-optimal fashion (without model reduction)
would require about 14 trials (see Figure 4). We are currently running labo-
ratory experimentswith eye tracking on real subjects using the rule learning
paradigmdescribed above and hope to supplement these experiments with
large cohort studies of reaction times and subjective reports of insight (e.g.,
crowd-sourcing neuroscience; Mohammadi, 2015).
5.3 Active Inference andArtificial Intelligence. Froman artificial intel-
ligence perspective, the rule-learning problem abovewould confoundmost
conventional approaches. For example, reinforcement learning and optimal
control theories are not applicable because the problem is epistemic (be-
lief based) in nature. This means that the optimal action depends on beliefs
or uncertainty. This precludes solutions based on the Bellman optimality
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principle (Bellman, 1952). Although, in principle, a belief-state (partially
observed) Markov decision process could be considered (Bonet & Geffner,
2014), the combinatorics of formulating beliefs states over 3 × 3 × 4 × 4 =
144 (rule, color, where, and choice) hidden states, with 4 × 4 × 3 = 36 (what,
where, and feedback) outcomes and a deep decision tree of five moves or
(4 × 4)5 = 1,048,576 policies, is daunting. Furthermore, simply optimizing
behavior does not address the problem of learning model parameters or
structure.
If we made the problem simpler and presented all the cues instanta-
neously (i.e., ignored the problem of what should be sampled), it is possible
that reinforcement or deep learning schemes (LeCun et al., 2015;Mnih et al.,
2015) could learn the model parameters. However, there is a principled rea-
son that such solutions may be uninteresting. If the objective is to minimize
the path or time integral of free energy, then one needs tominimize the time
(number of computations and samples) required to reduce free energy by a
given amount. This is the motivation for trying to solve the above problems
with a small number of samples. There is an interesting corollary of this
variational principle (of least action); one can use the thermodynamic free
energy as a proxy for variational free energy. This means that any solution
that requires a large computer or extensive processing time does not con-
form to the variational principle of least free energy and is probably not a
candidate for artificial intelligence capable of insight. In other words, if the
total amount of thermodynamic energy expended during convergence to
an (approximately) optimal solution is large, then the path integral of vari-
ational free energywill also be large and the path takenwill therefore violate
Hamilton’s principle of least action (and the variational free energy princi-
ple). The relationship between thermodynamic and variational free energy
is relatively straightforward to demonstrate using the Jarzynski equality
(Jarzynski, 1997), which allows one to show that variational and thermo-
dynamic free energy share the same minimum, in the limit of no sensory
samples (Sengupta, Stemmler, & Friston, 2013). The upshot of this analysis
is that a measure of the quality of intelligence is the simplicity and (ther-
modynamic) efficiency with which it can be simulated. If this argument is
right, it suggests that if we want to simulate intelligence or create artificial
consciousness, we should focus on the objective function and underlying
variational principles as opposed to large corpuses of training data.
We started this article with an oblique reference to artificial conscious-
ness, in the sense of shareable knowledge. In light of the treatment of in-
sight above, in terms of Bayesian model reduction, and the utility of prior
beliefs in facilitating the inference of other agents, it should be evident that
the sort of consciousness we are talking about is very elementary. We have
previously associated conscious processing with the process of inference
(Hobson & Friston, 2014). In pursuing that theme, Bayesian model reduc-
tion and implicit structure learning represent a hierarchically deep aspect
of inference; in the sense that it contextualizes inference at lower levels
Active Inference, Curiosity, and Insight 2671
of generative models (i.e., learning the parameters of a generative model
and inference about hidden states conditioned on those parameters). One
could argue that evolution performs Bayesian model (i.e., natural) selec-
tion (Frank, 2012; Campbell, 2016; Hobson & Friston, 2016). However, we
do not generally consider evolution as a conscious process: evolution is not
curious and does not profess insights. So what is special about the form of
inference considered in this article that entitles us to talk about conscious-
ness? Perhaps the simplest answer is the ability to select among compet-
ing hypotheses or models that are entertained within the same inference
engine (i.e., brain or mind). In other words, the hallmark of mindful infer-
ence may be the ability to represent or entertain counterfactual hypotheses
(Palmer, Seth, &Hohwy, 2015; Seth, 2015). This is not only a prerequisite for
Bayesianmodel selection—of the sort we have associatedwith insight—but
is also necessary for planning as inference (Attias, 2003; Botvinick & Tous-
saint, 2012): the selection of actions under beliefs about their consequences.
Indeed, we have previously argued that the hard problem of consciousness
itself (Chalmers, 1995) emerges from being able to entertain the counterfac-
tual hypothesis that we might not be conscious (Hobson & Friston, 2014).
Software Note
Although the generative model, specified by the (A,B,C,D) matrices,
changes from application to application, the belief updates in Figure 2 are
generic and can be implementedusing standard routines (here, spm_MDP_
VB_X.m). These routines are available as Matlab code in the SPM academic
software: http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/. The simulations in this arti-
cle can be reproduced (and customized) via a graphical user interface: by
typing >> DEM and selecting the rule learning demo.
Appendix
This appendix describes the generative model and how associated varia-
tional free energy is minimized during active inference. It is included for
readers who are versed in the formalism of Markov decision processes and
variational Bayes and those who want to understand the Matlab code that
reproduces the simulations in themain text (see the software note). For sim-
plicity, we deal with a single output modality and hidden factor. The gen-
eralizations for multimodal outputs and factorial states are provided in the
figures.
A.1 The Generative Model. The generative model underlying nearly
all formulations of (discrete) choice behavior can be parameterized as a
Markov decision process as follows (see Table 1 for a definition of the terms
in these and subsequent equations):
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P (o˜, s˜, π,A) = P(π )P(A)
T∏
τ=1
P(oτ |sτ )P(sτ |sτ−1, π ),
P (oτ |sτ ) = Cat(A),
P (sτ+1|sτ , π ) = Cat(Bπτ ),
P (s1|s0) = Cat(D),
P(oτ ) = σ (−Cτ ),
P(π ) = σ (−G),
P(A) = Dir(a). (A.1)
The approximate posterior over unknown or hidden states and parameters
x = (s˜, π,A) can be expressed in terms of its sufficient statistics or expecta-
tions x = (sπ0 , . . . , sπT ,π, a)
Q(x) = Q(s1|π ) . . .Q(sT |π )Q(π )Q(A),
Q (st |π ) = Cat(sπt ),
Q(π ) = Cat(π),
Q(A) = Dir(a). (A.2)
In this model, observations depend on only the current state, while state
transitions depend on a policy or sequence of actions. This (sequential) pol-
icy is sampled from a Gibbs distribution or softmax function of expected
free energy G(π ) that depends on a prior cost C over future outcomes (see
below). In more general formulations, the expected free energy would be
scaled by a precision or inverse temperature parameter that we have previ-
ously associated with dopaminergic signals (Friston et al., 2014).
A.2 Belief Updating. Bayesian inference corresponds to minimizing
variational free energy with respect to the expectations that constitute pos-
terior beliefs. Free energy can be expressed as the (time-dependent) free
energy under each policy plus the complexity incurred by posterior beliefs
about (time-invariant) policies and parameters, where (ignoring constants)
F = D[Q(x)||P(x)] − EQ[lnP(ot |x)]
=
∑
τ
EQ[F(π, τ )] +D[Q(π )||P(π )] +D[Q(A)||P(A)] + . . .
= π · (π + F + G) + (ai − ai) ·

Ai − ln B(ai) + . . .
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The free energy of hidden states is given by:
Fπ = F(π )
F(π ) =
∑
τ
F(π, τ )
F(π, τ ) = EQ[lnQ(sτ |π ) − lnP(sτ , oτ |sτ−1, π )]
= EQ[lnQ(sτ |π ) − lnP(sτ |sτ−1, oτ , π ) − lnP(oτ )]
= EQ[lnQ(sτ |π ) − lnP(sτ |sτ−1, π ) − lnP(oτ |sτ )]
= EQ[D[Q(sτ |π )||P(sτ |sτ−1, oτ , π )]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
relative entropy
− lnP(oτ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
log evidence
= EQ[D[Q(sτ |π )||P(sτ |sτ−1, π )]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
complexity
−EQ[lnP(oτ |sτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
accuracy
= sπτ · (sπτ −

Bπτ−1s
π
τ−1 −

A · oτ ). (A.3)
The expected free energy of a policy has the same form:
Gπ = G(π )
G(π ) =
∑
τ
G(π, τ )
G(π, τ ) = EQ˜[lnQ(A, sτ |π ) − lnP(A, sτ , oτ |o˜, π )]
= EQ˜[lnQ(A) + lnQ(sτ |π ) − lnP(A|sτ , oτ , o˜, π )
− lnP(sτ |oτ , o˜, π ) − lnP(oτ )]
≈ EQ˜[lnQ(A) + lnQ(sτ |π ) − lnQ(A|sτ , oτ , π )
− lnQ(sτ |oτ , π ) − lnP(oτ )]
= EQ˜[lnQ(A) − lnQ(A|sτ , oτ , π )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(negative parametric) mutual in f ormation
+ EQ˜[lnQ(sτ |π ) − lnQ(sτ |oτ , π )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(negative state) mutual in f ormation
−EQ˜[lnP(oτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected value
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= EQ˜[lnQ(A) − lnQ(A|sτ , oτ , π )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(negative) novelty
+ EQ˜[lnQ(oτ |π ) − lnP(oτ |sτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(negative)intrinsic value
−EQ˜[lnP(oτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
extrinsic value
= EQ˜[lnQ(A) − lnQ(A|sτ , oτ , π )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ignorance
+D[Q(oτ |π )||P(oτ )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk
+ EQ˜[H[P(oτ |sτ )]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ambiguity
= oπτ · W · sπτ + oπτ · (oπτ + Cτ ) + H · sπτ ,
H = −diag(A · A),
W = (ψ (a)−ψ (a0))− (ψ (a+ 1)−ψ (a0 + 1)) = a−10 − a−1, (A.4)
where Q˜ = Q(oτ , sτ |π ) = P(oτ |sτ )Q(sτ |π ) is the posterior predictive distri-
bution over future outcomes and hidden states. Figure 3 provides the
update rules based on minimizing variational free energy via a gradient
descent:
˙sπτ = −∂sF,
∂sF = sπτ − (

A · oτ +

Bπτ−1s
π
τ−1 +

Bπτ · sπτ+1).
The auxiliary variables sπτ = ln sn,πτ can be regarded as a postsynaptic
depolarization in a neuronal setting, while the resulting firing rate is a
sigmoid (softmax) function of depolarization sπτ = σ (sπτ ). The remaining
update rules are derived in a straightforward way as the expectations (of
policies and concentration parameters) at which their free energy gradients
are zero—and free energy is therefore minimized.
A.3 Bayesian Model Reduction. The relative evidence for a full model
and a reduced model with priors a′ can be derived from the application of
Bayes’ rule to both models (assuming A is a column vector for simplicity):
P(A|o˜,mR)
P(A|o˜,mF ) =
P(A|mR)
P(A|mF )
P(o˜|mF )
P(o˜|mR) ⇒
P(o˜|mR)
P(o˜|mF ) =
∫
dAP(A|o˜,mF )P(A|mR)P(A|mF ) ≈
∫
dAQ(A)
P(A|a′)
P(A|a)
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= B(a)B(a + a
′ − a)
B(a)B(a′)
P (A|a) = Dir(a) = B(a)
∏
i
Aa−1i .
Here, B(·) denotes the beta function. The evidence ratio in the second equal-
ity can now be expressed as a change in free energy:
F = lnP(o˜|mF ) − lnP(o˜|mR)
= ln B(a) + ln B(a′) − ln B(a) − ln B(a + a′ − a).
This provides a criterion to accept or reject an alternative hypothesis or re-
duced model structure that is encoded by the hyperparameters a′. Finally,
the reduced posteriors follow from the above equalities, should we accept
the reduced model:
Q (A|mR) = B(a + a′ − a)−1
∏
i
Aa+a
′−a−1
i = Dir(a + a′ − a).
Table 2: Glossary of Variables and Expressions.
Expression Description
oτ = (o1τ , . . . , oMτ ) : omτ ∈ {1, . . . ,Dm}
oτ = (o1τ , . . . , oMτ ) ∈ [0, 1]
omτ = lnomτ ∈ RDm
Outcomes inMmodalities (the mth modality
has Dm outcomes), their (future) posterior
expectations and logarithms
o˜= (o1, . . . , ot ) Sequences of outcomes until the current time
point.
sτ = (s1τ , . . . , sNτ ) : snτ ∈ {1, . . . ,Dn}
sτ = (s1τ , . . . , sNτ ) ∈ [0, 1]
snτ = ln snτ ∈ RDn
Hidden states over N factors (the nth modality
has Dn states), their posterior expectations
and logarithms
s˜ = (s1, . . . , sT ) Sequences of hidden states until the end of the
current trial
π ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
π = (π1, . . . ,πK ) : π ∈ [0, 1]

π = lnπ ∈ RT×K×N
K policies specifying action sequences, their
posterior expectations and logarithms
un ∈ {1, . . . ,L}
Un ∈ RK×T
Un,πτ ∈ {1, . . . ,L}
Action or control variables for each factor of
hidden states and sequences of actions
under the π th policy comprising allowable
actions
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Table 2: Continued.
Expression Description
Am = EQ[Am] = amam0 ∈ R
Dm×D1×...×DN

Am = EQ[lnAm] = ψ (am ) − ψ (am0 )
am0i j =
∑
i a
m
i j
Expected outcome probabilities (likelihood)
for the mth modality under each
combination of hidden states and their
expected logarithms, which depend on the
sum of concentration parameters for
outcome
am ∈ RDm×D1×...×DN
am ∈ RDm×D1×...×DN
Prior and posterior concentration parameters
of the likelihood
Bn,πτ ∈ {B1, . . .BU } ∈ RDn×Dn
Bn,πτ BUn,πτ

Bn,πτ = lnBn,πτ
Transition probabilities for the nth hidden
state under each action prescribed by a
policy at a particular time and its logarithm
Cmτ = − lnP(omτ ) Surprise associated with the mth
outcome—i.e., prior cost or negative
preference
Dn = P(sn1 |sn0 ) ∈ RDn Prior expectation of the nth hidden factor at
the beginning of each trial
F : Fπ = F(π ) =
∑
τ F(π, τ ) ∈ RK Variational free energy for each policy
G : Gπ = G(π ) =
∑
τ G(π, τ ) ∈ RK Expected free energy for each policy
Hm ∈ RD1×...×DN
Hmjk... = −
∑
iA
m
i jk... ·

Ami jk...
An array encoding the entropy or ambiguity
over outcomes for each combination of
hidden states
Wm = 1/am0 − 1/am An array encoding uncertainty about the
likelihood for each combination of
outcomes and hidden states
A ◦ s = A ◦ (s1, . . . , sN)
(A ◦ s)i =
∑
j,k... Ai, j,k...s
1
js
2
k . . .
Generalized dot product (or sum of products),
returning a vector
A ◦ s/n Generalized dot product over all but the nth
vector, returning a matrix
sn,πτ = σ (sn,πτ ) Expected hidden states n under a particular
policy
om,πτ = Am ◦ sπτ Expected outcomes m under a particular
policy
snτ =
∑
π ππ · sn,πτ Bayesian model average of hidden states over
policies
Cat(A)
Dir(a)
Categorical and Dirichlet distributions,
defined in terms of their sufficient statistics
(probabilities and concentration
parameters)
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Table 2: Continued.
Expression Description
σ (−G)π = exp(−Gπ )∑
π exp(−Gπ ) Softmax function, returning a vector that can
be treated as a proper probability
distribution
ψ (a) = dda ln	(a) Digamma function, defined as the derivative
of the log gamma function
B(a) = 	(a1 )	(a2 )···
	(a1+a2 ···) Beta function, used in the definition of the
Dirichlet distribution
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